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1962/10/30

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MEMORANDUM

LEThompson
October 30, 1962

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A number of decisions on specific questions in connection with carrying out the Cuban settlement are up for discussion. The way these are decided will constitute major policy decisions and it is suggested that the two most important of these be discussed first. These are:

1. Should we continue to go on the basis of considering this a United States-Soviet deal minimizing to the extent possible the Cuban role, or should we shift to Castro? I would recommend we adopt the former course to the extent possible, although the Cubans are bound to get into the act to some extent through U Thant's discussions.
2. We should decide what we really want in the Cuban situation and, to the extent that our objectives appear attainable, gear our other decisions accordingly. There would appear to be two choices.
 - a) One is to concentrate upon the Soviet missiles and long-range bombers.
 - b) The other would be to attempt to get the Soviets entirely out of Cuba from a military point of view.

The following factors bear on this situation:

- i) We are on record as having said that one of our two non-negotiable points was breaking the military tie between Cuba and the Soviet Union. There are some firm indications that the Soviets would be prepared to accept this. For example, they are agreeable to the Red Cross checking to prevent the importation of any REPEAT ANY weapons into Cuba. A major factor bearing on this aspect is whether or not the

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Cubans would be capable, in a short time, of being trained to operate the surface-to-air missile installations. It could well be that once the Soviets have removed their long-range missiles they will not wish to have a military responsibility in Cuba.

- ii) The Soviets will undoubtedly insist upon having agricultural and other technicians in Cuba and this could be used as a cover for maintaining military personnel there, but my judgment is that if the Soviets remove all Soviet-operated military equipment, they will not wish to have other military personnel involved.
- iii) If we go for complete removal of Soviet-Cuban military tie, we will have to go much further in our guarantee against invasion and will have to reasonably satisfy the Cubans that they will be safe from United States supported emigre groups. This would involve probably some inspection of installations in Florida, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere, the location of which is doubtless known to the Cubans. We might not be able to deliver on other countries but if we agreed to UN inspection of United States territory, the Cubans would probably accept. The most difficult problem in this connection would be how we handled the question of subversive activities in general. We probably cannot control broadcasts from other countries directed at Cuba and it is doubtful if Castro would cease his activities in this field. Sooner or later there is likely to be either a Palace revolution in Cuba or a popular uprising. Should a revolt occur in one or more provinces, it would be difficult for the United States to resist pressures from emigre groups and public opinion in this country. This course would virtually require the neutralization of Cuba, with unsirable precedents for Berlin.

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- iv) The other course would be to go for the elimination of long-range and nuclear weapons with only general language on subversion and probably having our guarantee against invasion qualified by stating it is based on the assumption that Cuba will follow a peaceful course.

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